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The Chilean Left in Power 
Achievements~ Failures~ and Omissions 
Evelyne Huber, Jennifer Pribble, and John D. Stephens 
In his introduction to this volume, Weyland locates the administrations of 
Socialist Presidents Ricardo Lagos (2ooo-o6) and Michelle Bachelet (2oo6-
20io) closest to the moderate pole among current leftist governments in Latin 
America. We concur and hope to contribute to the discussion by elucidating 
the sources of this moderation and examining the performance of these govern-
ments in the areas of political management, economic policies, and social poli-
cies and labor market reforms. The Lagos and Bachelet governments have pur-
sued similar market-friendly economic policies to their predecessors. Although 
both presidents have made important progress in overcoming the political insti-
tutionallegacies of Augusto Pinochet's dictatorship, moderate progress in labor 
market policies, and impressive progress in two social policy areas, very little 
improvement has been seen in the realm of fostering citizen participation and 
empowering labor and social movements through organization and linkages 
to political parties. We compare the Lagos and Bachelet governments to those 
of their Christian Democratic predecessors as well as to each other with the 
goal of identifying policy successes, failures, and omissions. We argue that 
the administrations' moderation stems from the political experiences of the 
leadership and their resulting approach to building relationships to the party 
rank-and-file and to civil society, the fact that these are coalition governments, 
and the constraints of the Pinochet political and economic legacies. 
POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS AND MANAGEMENT 
Political constraints in contemporary Chile originate from institutional design 
(the Pinochet-era constitution), political learning among left-party elites, the 
organizational weakness of left-leaning parties, and the fact that these are 
coalition governments. All four forms of political constraint have contributed to 
the moderation that characterized the left governments of Lagos and Bachelet. 
In this section we discuss the evolution of these constraints, paying particular 
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attention to the extent to which the two governments were able to manage and 
ease the political restrictions. 
Lagos assumed office in 2000 as the first Socialist president since Salvador 
Allende. Just like his predecessor Concertaci6n presidents, he found his politi-
cal space constrained by the authoritarian enclaves institutionalized by means 
of the Pinochet-era constitution. One of the key constraints imposed by the 
constitution was the provision of appointed senators. These senators kept 
the Concertaci6n parties from obtaining control of the Senate, thus forcing 
the left government to negotiate with the opposition on all important legis-
lation. Other constraints imposed by the military-era constitution were the 
lack of civilian control over the chief commander of the armed forces and an 
electoral system that favors the minority right-wing parties. 
Arguably one of the most important achievements of the Lagos presidency 
was the package of constitutional reforms adopted in August 2005 that -
among other measures - eliminated the appointed senators, gave the president 
the power to remove the chiefs of the branches of the armed forces, and cur-
tailed the powers of the National Security Council. The publication of findings 
of a commission to study torture appointed in 2004 indirectly helped prepar,e 
the ground for these constitutional changes by highlighting the horrors that had 
been committed by a military institution devoid of any external accountability. 
These reforms, then, essentially completed the transition to democracy by elimi-
nating the last clearly antidemocratic legacies of the dictatorship. 1 Importantly, 
however, this package of reforms did not constitute a sweeping change to the 
overall institutional configuration of the Chilean state. The institutional con-
tinuity in Chile stands in stark contrast to the efforts made by Hugo Chavez 
in Venezuela and Evo Morales in Bolivia to fundamentally restructure the 
national constitution, which Javier Corrales and George Gray Molina examine 
in their chapters in this volume. In part, this difference is a result of the very 
long and strong tradition of constitutional rule in Chile and of the strength of 
the military dictatorship. The military regarded itself as successful at the end 
of its rule and still enjoyed significant support among parts of the population, 
which made renewed intervention in case of radical departures in the 1990s a 
real possibility. 
A second important political constraint that has influenced the moderation 
of the Bachelet and Lagos administrations is the fact that these are coalition 
governments. The coalition is decidedly center-left, and maintaining the polit-
ical partnership and negotiating candidacies have been key tasks for the top 
leadership. Various authors have emphasized the strong incentives for coalition 
formation built into the binomial electoral system (Carey 1999, Fuentes 1999), 
r See Aguero (2oo6) and Funk (2oo6) for a discussion of these reforms and their significance. The 
electoral system is another Pinochet legacy that has not been changed yet, but the reforms made 
it easier to change, and there are many electoral systems (including the American and British 
systems) that discriminate against smaller parties and/or overrepresent certain political forces, 
such as conservatives from rural areas. 
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but others have pointed to the incentives for the member parties to distance 
themselves from a potentially unpopular president and to the possibility of a 
collapse of the coalition (Siavelis 2005). So far, the coalition has held at the 
electoral level, but at the parliamentary level, the government lost a crucial 
vote for funding Trans-Santiago in November 2007 because of the defection of 
Christian Democratic deputies led by Senator Adolfo Zaldivar. 2 Clearly, this 
was a major setback for President Bachelet, and it highlighted the imperative of 
seeking compromise internally in the Concertaci6n and, where possible, with 
the Alianza as well.3 
Indeed, a major challenge to both Lagos and Bachelet relates to political 
management, the task of maintaining the coalition, and achieving agreement 
on policy initiatives. This challenge has been all the more difficult because 
of serious internal splits within the member parties of the coalition. The main 
ideological divide at the mass and the elite levels since the beginning of the tran-
sition has been between the prodemocracy and the pro-Pinochet or authoritar-
ian camp rather than between the market-friendly and the state interventionist 
camp (Fuentes 1999, Luna 2006, Ruiz 2oo6). Yet, there are also consistent dif-
ferences at the level of political elites between the Concertaci6n and the Alianza, 
and within the Concertaci6n parties between those embracing the market and 
those preferring a stronger role of the state. Data from three waves of inter-
views with members of parliament show that these political elites place parties 
and themselves on a left-right scale. The Christian Democratic Party (PDC) 
is located in a centrist position and the Socialist Party (PS) and the Party for 
Democracy (PPD) to the left of it. Both party placement and self-placement cor-
relate with preferences regarding the relative weights of state and market (Luna 
2006, Ruiz 2006). The differences between the Concertaci6n and the Alianza 
are not large but very consistent over the three periods (1993-7; 1997-2001; 
2001-05). There are no differences on preferences for state interventionism 
between the PDC and the other two C6ncertaci6n parties in the first period. 
But in the second and third periods, the PDC members of parliament have a 
lower preference for state intervention than the PS and PPD members (Ruiz 
2006: 91). There are additional factors that divide the Concertaci6n parties: 
religiosity and moral conservatism. The PDC members of parliament indicate 
a higher degree of religiosity than even their counterparts in the RN; only the 
UDI members are more religious and morally conservative (Ruiz 2006: 93).4 
2 Zaldivar was expelled from the party in December 2007. In January 2008, Zaldivar and three 
other independent senators reached an agreement with the right-wing Alianza por Chile to share 
the presidency of the Senate for the following two years. According to the agreement, the group 
of independent senators would hold the presidency for the first year and the Alianza would hold 
the spot for the second year. 
3 This imperative is responsible for the failure of a redistributive provision to be included in the 
final version of the AUGE health plan, for instance. 
4 Certainly this division explains why it took until 2004 to legalize divorce and why abortion 
legislation remains the most conservative in Latin America (Blofield 2006). 
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Added to these programmatic divisions between Concertaci6n member par-
ties have been internal divisions within these parties. On the one hand, several 
authors have highlighted the existence of a partido transversal, that is, a set 
of political leaders from all the Concertaci6n parties who share a commitment 
to the preservation of a market-friendly economic model and to a technocratic 
style of policymaking (Boeninger 1997; Fuentes 1999). This group of leaders 
has dominated the political process and held the coalition together. On the 
other side are politicians within each of the Concertaci6n parties who would 
prefer more state intervention to address the problems of poverty and inequality 
more aggressively. They also would prefer a more open style of policymaking, 
more input from the base, and closer relations to civil society. So far, their 
influence has been weakened by historical legacies and structural factors. 
Another constraint is generated by the fact that a large sector of the Con-
certaci6n tends to exhibit an aversion toward popular mobilization. Indeed, 
the two main Chilean left parties, the PS and PPD, were formed during (in the 
case of the PPD) or reconstituted after (in the case of the PS) the dictatorship 
as elite-directed parties without strong base organizations or ties to civil soci-
ety. The hegemonic elite groups in both parties, who had gone through the 
Allende years and the experience of persecution and exile, had concluded that 
uncontrolled popular pressures had been a major factor in the fall of Allende. 
Therefore, they deliberately kept their distance from party bases and popular 
organizations) The parties' resistance to open discussions and democratic pro-
cedures for the formulation of party programs and candidate selection stands 
in contrast to classic left parties in Europe, as well as to the Broad Front (FA) in 
Uruguay and the Workers' Party (PT) in Brazil. It weakens the organizational 
capacity of Chile's left. And, of course, this practice stands in stark contrast to 
the mobilization efforts of the contestatory left in Venezuela and Bolivia. 
Chile's left parties do have statutes that regulate internal policymaking 
and candidate selection in principle, but in practice, party business is mostly 
done through negotiations among the leadership. 6 As Pepe Auth, the secretary 
5 See Roberts (1998} for an analysis of the experiences of these leaders during the Allende period 
and the dictatorship. See Pribble (2.oo8) for an analysis of the structure of these parties since the 
transition. 
6 The closed and elite-centered nature of the parties bears a significant part of the responsibility for 
the fact that the Concertaci6n lost the Presidency in January 2.010, when its PDC candidate and 
former President Eduardo Frei was defeated by Sebastian Pifiera of RN. The victory was narrow, 
with Pifiera obtaining 51.6 percent of the vote in the second round of elections. Despite the 
Right's electoral victory, Bachelet maintained record-high levels of approval and Concertaci6n 
policies such as AUGE and the pension reform continued to enjoy strong support. Indeed, Pifiera 
had promised not to roll back the Concertaci6n's social programs. Thus, rather than a rejection 
of the Concertaci6n's political program, the 2010 electoral defeat seems to be tied to the coalition 
parties' exclusive character and to a lack of renovation among the party elites (Siavelis 2009 ). 
The impressive performance of independent left candidate, Marco Enriquez-Ominami, who won 
just over 20 percent of the vote in the first round of the elections after campaigning against 
the lack of new leadership inside the Concertaci6n coalition, provides clear evidence of public 
frustration with the nature of the center-left parties. 
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general of the PPD, put it: "The PPD went through a period that could be char-
acterized as one of anomie, that is, of absence of norms that would explain, 
justify, and ·legitimize the decisions taken by the leadership bodies" (Auth 
2007). In an effort to improve democratic procedures in a party originating in 
the fight for democracy, the PPD became the only party that finally made its 
membership list public. In 2007, it undertook a major renovation of its statutes 
to strengthen transparency and adherence to formal procedures. 
The fact remains that neither left party provides for much input from the base 
and for transparent and democratic ways to resolve internal disagreements. 
The weakness of input from the base reinforces the tendency of officeholders 
to avoid radical departures from the status quo and instead seek compromise 
by moving toward the center. This has certainly increased the maneuvering 
room that left politicians enjoy in Chile, but it has also deprived them of the 
opportunity to mobilize popular support for reform policies that they favored 
but the right opposed. Labor law reform is perhaps the area where this became 
clearest. There is another potential danger inherent in this distancing. Leaders 
of social organizations have no trusted partners in the government with whom 
to negotiate and instead have to rely on mobilization in the streets if they want 
to achieve something. This puts the government on the spot - forced to choose 
between appearing weak in the face of pressure if it makes concessions and 
having to use repression if it makes none. The student demonstrations in 2006 
and 2007 are a case in point. They did not bring much in terms of desired 
reforms for the students but damaged the image of the government. Certainly, 
this distance has prevented the formation of a strong proreform group of 
politicians within the Concertaci6n able to build coordinated pressure from 
within and without to make progress in areas where reform has stalled. 
One factor that keeps party organization weak is lack of resources. The 
parties do not have an income from dues that would allow them to work 
with a significant full-time staff in charge of building the party and directing 
internal party life toward greater institutionalized participation.? The lack of a 
large dues-paying base and of close ties to popular organizations that could be 
mobilized at election time empowers the moderate sectors of the leadership in 
still another way. It renders the left parties dependent on large private donors 
for financing elections. This is a particularly serious problem in light of the 
very high cost of Chilean elections. Estimates show that the cost of a campaign 
for the Senate in 1997 and 2001 in districts with more than 5oo,ooo voters, 
ranged from US$8 5o,ooo to US$ 5 million. For an average-sized district, the 
cost ranged from US$25o,ooo to US$3 million. The average cost of a campaign 
for the Chamber of Deputies ranged from US$ r oo,ooo to US$ 3 4o,ooo (Fuentes 
2004). After years of failed efforts to provide public financing to parties and 
regulate campaign expenditures - efforts for the most part blocked by the 
right- in 2003 the Congress finally passed a law (complemented in 2004 with 
a law that established sanctions for violations) that regulated the financing 
7 Garret6n ( 200 5) discusses party finances, campaign costs, and legislation. 
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of campaigns. The law was part of the "Agenda for the Modernization of 
the State," which began to command support in the midst of a number of 
corruption scandals (Garret6n 200 5 ). The law established caps on expenditures 
for each candidate, as well as limits on private donations from each individual, 
and it provided for state reimbursement of campaign expenditures. However, 
the law did not provide public funding to political parties for their ongoing 
activities -only for election campaigns - and it did not provide public funding 
for presidential elections. Moreover, the ceilings on expenditures and donations 
were set very high, thus perpetuating the advantage of the right, which greatly 
outspends the left, and the enforcement capacity of the electoral administration 
has been limited. As a result, dependence on private donations- including from 
corporations- remains a factor favoring a proprivate sector policy orientation. 
Indeed, the Chilean case is characterized by a high level of political con-
straints, including institutional design, political learning, organizationally weak 
left parties, and the need to govern in coalition. In the remainder of this analysis 
we provide an overview of the accomplishments, shortcomings, and omissions 
of the Lagos and Bachelet governments in the area of economic, social, and 
labor policy. We pay close attention to how political constraints moderated the 
speed and breadth of transformation. 
ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT 
The main goals of the Concertaci6n governments have been to protect macro-
economic stability, generate economic growth and employment, invest in 
human capital, and alleviate poverty. In the pursuit of these goals they adopted 
conservative fiscal policies, strengthened the independence of the Central Bank, 
deepened Chilean integration into world markets, increased expenditures for 
education and health care, increased the minimum wage, and provided targeted 
programs for those in extreme poverty. The Lagos and Bachelet governments 
followed this set of commitments just as their Christian Democratic predeces-
sors had, intensifying efforts in health, education, and poverty relief. How-
ever, they did originate two major departures away from targeting on extreme 
poverty and toward universalistic, rights-based social policy, with the Regime 
of Explicit Health Guarantees (AUGE) under Lagos and the pension reform 
under Bachelet, both of which will be examined later in this chapter. Put sim-
ply, Chile's left governments have maintained the orthodox economic policies 
of their predecessors, but they have pursued a distinct form of social pol-
icy that moves toward a more universal system of social protection, inspired 
by left commitments to social equity, justice, and solidarity (see Weyland's 
introduction). 
In fiscal policy, the Concertaci6n governments of the 1990s adhered to the 
unwritten rule of fiscal responsibility, stipulating that all new expenditures 
required new revenue. Under Lagos, the government established a rule that 
the primary balance should yield a surplus of 1 percent under conditions of 
expected growth and "normal" copper prices (Munoz Goma 2007). In Septem-
ber 2oo6, the government promulgated the fiscal responsibility law (Ley 20128) 
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that established (I) the requirement that each president at the beginning of 
her/his term establish the bases of fiscal policy for her/his administration and 
spell out the implications of this policy for the structural balance; (2) a con-
tingency program to combat unemployment; (3) a pension reserve fund; (4) a 
fund for economic and social stabilization; and (5) capital transfers to the Cen-
tral Bank. The structural surplus was to be channeled into these funds and the 
Central Bank. The Fund for Economic and Social Stabilization incorporated 
the existing stabilization fund based on copper revenue. 
All Concertaci6n governments justified fiscal austerity with the constraints 
imposed by international financial markets and the argument that macroeco-
nomic stability is crucial to protect the poor and invest in human capital on 
a consistent basis. Of course, in the early years of the transition the govern-
ment did have to prove to domestic and foreign investors that the Concertaci6n 
would provide a stable economic environment. It is also true that high inflation 
and wild economic fluctuations hurt those without assets and stable employ-
ment the most, and that social expenditures are particularly vulnerable to 
recessions and budget deficits. On the one hand, one might question whether 
maintenance of macroeconomic stability and investor confidence requires a I 
percent structural surplus more than a decade after the transition. On the other 
hand, one might see the provisions of the financial responsibility law as a smart 
move to earmark revenue for pensions and counter-cyclical spending. One 
might even portray it as the opposite of Reaganomics -U.S. President Reagan 
created structural deficits and thus pressures to cut expenditures. Lagos invested 
the structural surplus and thus created resources to sustain expenditures during 
economic downturns. 
To explain the fiscal conservatism of the Concertaci6n, one certainly has to 
come back again to the political experiences and ideology of policymakers. 8 
There is clearly a visceral aversion among the hegemonic leadership group 
against any kind of populism, defined as expansionary economic policies in 
response to popular pressures. This aversion stems from their analysis of the 
failure of the Allende government. As one high official in the Ministry of 
Finance who was politically active during the Allende years explained it: "It is 
not about 'levels' of orthodoxy; once you cross the threshold you don't know 
where you will end up. You cannot be half pregnant; either you are or you 
are not. I guess we probably have the feeling ... that eventually the market will 
catch you" (Pribble 2oo6a). 
The leadership group also firmly believes in the benefits of international 
markets and in the need to accept their constraints. During the early I990s, 
Chile put in place controls on international capital flows in the form of a 
deposit requirement designed to discourage short-term flows (Ffrench-Davis 
2002: 224). Arguably, these controls protected Chile from suffering even worse 
effects from the Asian crisis ip. I998. Nevertheless, these controls were lifted 
8 We use the concept of ideology here to include the following three components: an analysis of 
the deficiencies of the existing social order, a vision of a desirable social order, and a strategy to 
get there from here. 
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in 200I, along with the requirement of advance notification of the entry and 
exit of capital, as a signal to international markets that Chile was trying to 
attract foreign capital (Munoz Goma 2007: I22). Another policy that sig-
naled a commitment to conservative monetary policy was the strengthening 
of the independence of the Central Bank by the Lagos government. Finally, 
in regards to international commodity markets, tariffs have continued to be 
lowered since I990 and the Concertaci6n governments signed a number of 
free trade agreements, most importantly with the United States, the EU, and 
Japan. The agreements with the EU and the United States were signed under 
Lagos. In short, it is clear that there was no deviation from the commitment 
to free markets and conservative fiscal and monetary policies under the Lagos 
government at all. If anything, liberalization of markets was deepened and the 
commitment to a structural surplus was strengthened. 
However, the real significance of the fiscal responsibility law with its provi-
sions for stabilization funds will only emerge over the medium and long run. 
In the short run, it has already facilitated the adoption of the pension reform, 
because part of the future funding is to come from the Pension Reserve Fund. 
This fund receives up to 0.5 percent of GDP from the fiscal surplus every year, 
and no less than 0.2 percent of GDP, to be invested and to grow for ten years, 
at which point it can be used as a complementary source to pay for basic 
solidarity pensions and for supplementary solidarity pensions. The program 
to combat unemployment does require budgetary funding each year, so it is 
not protected against declines in revenue. However, the Economic and Social 
Stabilization Fund, to be financed by the copper stabilization fund. and what 
remains of the fiscal surplus after contributions to the Pension Reserve Fund 
and possible transfers to the Central Bank, could be used for counter-cyclical 
spending. In the wake of a public debate about the merits of the I percent 
surplus rule, in which prominent economists and members of the Concertaci6n 
parties participated, the Bachelet government decided to lower the structural 
surplus rule to 0.5 percent in 2007 (Munoz Goma 2007: II2). However, due 
to the copper boom, the current surplus reached a high of 8.7 percent of GDP 
in 2007, up from the previous historic high of 7·7 percent of GDP in 2006. The 
Pension Reserve Fund received US$ I. 5 billion and the Economic and Social 
Stabilization Fund US$14 billion (figures from Government Budget Director, 
reported in Infolatam 2oo8). In 2008, following a significant decline in the 
price of copper, Chile's budget surplus was smaller, equaling about 5.2 percent 
of GDP (EFE 2009). 
The importance of the Concertaci6n's fiscal surplus policy was made acutely 
clear in January 2009, when the Bachelet administration drew on national 
savings to fund an economic stimulus package worth 2.8 percent of GDP 
(Moffett 2009).9 The stimulus seeks to minimize the negative consequences of 
the global economic crisis and economists project that as a result, Chile's GDP 
9 As a point of comparison, the stimulus package passed by U.S. President Barack Obama was 
equivalent to about 2 percent of GDP (Moffett 2009). 
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should decline by less than I percent during 2009 (Moffett 2009 ). The ability of 
the government to respond quickly and decisively to the economic crisis appears 
to have had positive political consequences, with President Bachelet's approval 
reaching a record level of 67 percent in May 2009, making her the most popular 
president since Chile's return to democracy (CEP 2009: 20). Moreover, the 
same poll revealed that Finance Minister Andres Velasco is currently the second 
most popular politician in Chile, with 50 percent of the population expressing 
positive sentiment about his work (CEP 2009: 3 7). This is a notable turnaround 
from 2007, when many citizens, politicians, and members of the media called 
for Velasco's resignation because of his refusal to spend the windfall copper 
profits. These numbers suggest that the Concertaci6n's commitment to prudent 
fiscal policy may have provided long-term political returns. 
In order to shed some light on the relative role of international economic 
forces, the coalition with the Christian Democrats, and the market-friendly 
orientation of the Concertaci6n's top economic advisors, we can compare the 
macroeconomic policies of the Lagos and Bachelet governments with those 
of European social democracy in general - and those of Nordic and Austrian 
social democracy in particular - where social democracy has been very strong 
and thus least constrained by other political forces (e.g., coalition partners). 
During the golden age of postwar European capitalism, before the end of 
the Bretton Woods system and the first oil shock in the early I 97os, these 
countries were faced with an open trading system, both low tariffs and high 
dependence on manufactured exports, and closed international capital markets. 
Contrary to commonplace assumptions, social democratic governments carried 
out austere fiscal policy during this period, running budget surpluses in most 
years (Huber and Stephens I998). They did this in large part to counterbalance 
the stimulation they were applying on the monetary side. With government 
control of central banks and a range of C<,lpital controls in place, they were able 
to set interest rates below international rates in order to stimulate investment 
and economic activity. 
All advanced industrial countries moved to reduce the controls on interna-
tional capital flows after the end of the Bretton Woods system. In this envi-
ronment, it was impossible to control exchange rates and interest rates at the 
same time. Eventually, all European countries opted to pursue stable exchange 
rates, thus tying their hands in monetary policy. It was only a small additional 
step to make central banks independent of government as the governments 
had little monetary latitude anyway. Thus, the experience of European social 
democracy suggests that the Lagos and Bachelet governments could not have 
followed very different macroeconomic policies had they been freed from the 
constraints of their coalition partners and/or had they had economic advisors 
of a more neo-Keynesian bent. The most that would have been possible would 
have been to set somewhat lower interest rates and thus accept a lower value 
of the peso. 
In the area of infrastructure investment, much has been done, primarily via 
concessions to private enterprises; the financing has come from a combination 
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of state and private investment and user fees. This seems to have worked very 
well in the case of toll roads. For instance, the connection from the airport to 
downtown (and uptown) Santiago is much faster than it used to be. Similarly, 
the expansion of the Santiago Metro to poorer areas further from the center 
is an area of important success. On the other hand, Metro prices are high for 
low-income people who have to take it to work. Even worse, the attempt to 
reduce congestion, noise, and exhaust fumes from minibuses by substituting 
large modern buses connecting to the Metro, known as Trans-Santiago, was 
a spectacular failure. The new system lacked the capacity to transport all the 
passengers, and public frustration reached boiling levels. In order for Trans-
Santiago to work, massive additional investments in buses would have been 
required. The government asked for additional financing but suffered a major 
defeat in the Senate when Christian Democratic senators defected in late 2007. 
The overall economic performance seems to vindicate the Concertaci6n's 
policy commitments. Inflation was brought down from the two-digit range 
in the early 1990s to below 5 percent in the period 1998-2006.10 Economic 
growth has been high, with only 1999 being a year of negative growth. Growth 
rates of GDP per capita from 2003-06 were in the range of 3-5 percent. 
This remains a high rate of growth, even though observers have pointed out 
that average growth rates declined from 7·3 percent of GDP under Aylwin to 
5. 3 percent under Frei, 4· 3 percent under Lagos, and 4.2 percent under Bachelet 
(Munoz Goma 2007: 20). Investment rates (gross fixed capital formation) 
have been high - between 20 and 25 percent- among the highest in Latin 
America. Of course, copper prices helped greatly in the past few years. Chile's 
terms of trade jumped from 103 (index 2000 = roo) in 2003 to r84 in 2oo6, 
an increase only rivaled by Venezuela's terms of trade among all the Latin 
American countries. Some of the benefits of this growth clearly trickled down. 
Real average wages had increased by II points (index 2000 = roo) by 2006. 
The minimum wage increased in nominal terms by 640 percent from 1990 
to 2003, while the consumer price index increased by 280 percent (Marinakis 
2007; BADEINSO/ECLAC). It kept increasing, from 12 7,500 pesos to r 3 5 ,ooo 
pesos in 2006 and 144,ooo pesos in 2007. Poverty decreased from 39 percent 
in 1990 to 19 percent in 2003 and 14 percent in 2006 (CASEN 2006). 
Still, weaknesses in the economic model remain that do not augur well for 
a future when the present commodity boom will be over. Most importantly, 
the export-led growth is heavily based on copper, wood products, and agricul-
tural goods. Very little technological upgrading has taken place. Investment in 
research and development (R&D) is low by international comparison, and in 
particular, private participation in it is low (Munoz Goma 2007: r65). In an 
effort to boost funds available for research and development, the Lagos admin-
istration passed a royalty tax on private copper mining companies operating 
in Chile. Although Chile was one of few countries not taxing the profits of 
private firms, the 5 percent tax on companies with output of more than fifty 
10 The data in this paragraph are all from ECLAC 2007, unless otherwise noted. 
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thousand tons faced fierce opposition from the right. Therefore, its approval is 
an important achievement. · 
Essentially, the Concertaci6n governments have stayed away from an activist 
industrial policy, preferring a horizontal (not sectorally focused) and demand-
driven approach, following the lead of the private sector (Peres 2006). This of 
course has been the approach preferred by neoliberals (if they conceded the 
need for any kind of industrial policy at all), but it is not the approach that suc-
cessful developmental states or successful parts thereof have used (Evans 199 5 ). 
Without strong incentives provided by the state, one should not expect major 
Chilean investors to develop new industries. The Chilean economy is highly 
concentrated, with ten large and highly diversified corporations controlling 89 
percent of all corporate assets in 1999 (Agosin y Pasten 2003; cited in Munoz 
Goma 2007: 31). As long as the current economic model produces growth 
and lets them profit handsomely, they have little reason to take major risks by 
breaking into uncharted territory and investing in high-technology manufac-
turing. A strong indicator of the lack of interest among Chilean employers in 
upgrading is the fact that more than 6o percent of the resources made avail-
able by the state to enterprises for labor training are not used (Munoz Goma 
2007: 172). This is particularly remarkable given the comparatively low aver-
age quality of the human capital base in Chile (OECD/Statistics Canada 2000: 
136-?). 
In the political discussion about the best ways to make use of the copper 
windfall, the proposal for an innovations fund has attracted considerable atten-
tion. There is wide agreement on the need to prevent "Dutch disease,"II and 
the Ministry of Finance under Bachelet proposed to use the Social and Eco-
nomic Stabilization Fund in part for investment in education and technological 
innovation. Other proposals abound, such as proposals from the political right 
to lower taxes and finance social expenditures with copper revenue, which of 
course would make them highly vulnerable to copper price fluctuations. 
A further weakness in the Chilean model that is rarely mentioned is the low 
labor force participation rate, fluctuating around 55 percent since 1999. This 
is one of the very lowest participation rates in Latin America (ECLAC 2007: 
A-16). It is heavily due to the very low female labor force participation rate-
the lowest in Latin America- with only 42 percent of women in the labor force 
in 2000. The female economic activity rate as a percentage of the male rate was 
57, tied with Mexico for the lowest (Abramo and Valenzuela 2006: 375). The 
reasons for this state of affairs are complex, stemming from both the demand 
(job creation) and the supply side (making it possible for women to combine 
work and family obligations, and changing attitudes about gender roles), but 
u Dutch disease is the decline of the manufacturing sector caused by large inflows of foreign 
exchange and thus an overvaluation of the exchange rate. Generally, this inflow of foreign 
exchange is due to the discovery and export of natural resources, but it could also happen 
because of a large inflow of foreign direct investment. The term was coined to describe the 
experience of the Netherlands after the discovery of a large natural gas field in 1959. 
88 Evelyne Huber, jennifer Pribble, and John D. Stephens 
the first change on the supply side came with Bachelet's plan to greatly expand 
public child care. 
Certainly a persistent and fundamental weakness of the Chilean model -
if we take the commitment to growth with equity or simply to investment 
in human capital seriously- is the low tax burden. In 2005, the tax burden 
was I9 percent of GDP, clearly lower than countries in other regions with 
comparable levels of development. In I990, the Aylwin government succeeded 
in negotiating with the right a tax increase of 2 percent of GDP to finance 
social expenditures. Thereafter, however, business and the right strenuously 
opposed an increase in direct taxation, forcing the Concertaci6n to rely on 
more regressive indirect taxes. Despite a 200I law that managed to reduce tax 
evasion to some extent (Munoz Goma 2007: I I 3 ), legal tax avoidance remains 
a major problem. The major vehicle is the formation of corporations and the 
channeling of personal income and expenditures through these corporations, 
with a tax rate of I7 percent compared to a top marginal income tax rate of 
40 percent. 
Tax policy is one area where constraints resulting from an overrepresented 
right and a powerful business lobby become very clear. In the negotiations 
in I990, the Concertaci6n wanted to increase the corporate income tax from 
IO percent to 2o0 percent but had to settle for 15 percent. President Lagos 
emphasized that total taxes had to increase, but he was only able to raise the 
corporate income tax rate to I7 percent. This compares to a Latin American 
average of 30 percent (Fairfield 2007, based on data from Price Waterhouse 
Coopers). 
SOCIAL POLICY AND LABOR LEGISLATION 
Whereas economic policy was characterized by continuity between left presi-
dents Lagos and Bachelet and their Christian Democratic predecessors, social 
policy was propelled forward in innovative ways, albeit under the constraints 
of the coalition and a powerful right. The key reforms introduced under Lagos 
were Plan AUGE in health care, Chile Solidario in the fight against poverty, 
unemployment insurance, legalization of divorce, and an attempt at changes 
in labor legislation. Bachelet continued to expand Plan AUGE and to seek 
better protection for workers through regulation of subcontracting. She imple-
mented a far-reaching reform of the pension system and proposed an ambitious 
expansion of child care and preschool education. 
When the Concertaci6n came to power, they inherited a two-class health 
care system established by Pinochet. Employees could choose to direct their 
mandatory contributions to the public health care system FONASA, or to a 
private health insurance company, an ISAPRE. ISAPREs are free to require 
additional contributions, decide on different contributions for different cat-
egories of subscribers, and determine coverage of services. As a result, they 
attract particularly upper income, younger, and healthier subscribers. In 2003, 
72 percent of users used the public system and I6.3 percent relied on an 
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ISAPRE (Lenz 2005: 288). Despite significant increases in public health care 
expenditures during the 1990s, the differences between the public and the pri-
vate health care sectors remained large. In 1999 ISAPREs spent an estimated 
177,633 pesos per person compared to 99,308 pesos per capita by FONASA 
(Titelman 2ooo: 17). Moreover, when ISAPRE subscribers got seriously ill, 
they would often seek treatment in the public sector because of coverage limits 
in the private sector. AUGE was conceived as universal coverage for the most 
common illnesses for users of both public and private sector health care, to be 
financed in part by directing a part of everybody's health care contributions to 
a national solidarity fund. 
The plan was launched in 2002, but negotiations delayed adoption until 
2004 and resulted in several curtailments. Originally, fifty-six illnesses were 
to be covered immediately, but finally they were phased in, beginning with 
twenty-five illnesses in 2005 and reaching the full fifty-six in 2007. Impor-
tantly from a point of view of equity, the solidarity fund was eliminated and 
replaced with an inter-ISAPRE risk-pooling fund. There was internal opposi-
tion in the coalition against this fund, coming from sectors of the Christian 
Democrats, as well as strenuous opposition from the ISAPREs and the parties 
of the right (Davila 2005). The proposed financing through a tax on alcohol 
and cigarettes was replaced with a I percentage point increase in the value-
added tax and by new copayments (Espinosa, Tokman, and Rodriguez 2005). 
However, income-related caps were put on the total copayments for AUGE 
illnesses from families (Pribble 2008). The law also created a new regulatory 
agency (Superintendencia de Salud) in charge of enforcing the guarantees of 
timely treatment of these illnesses. The Bachelet administration extended the 
illnesses covered under AUGE to sixty-two by 2008 and committed to a goal 
of eighty illnesses by 2010.12 AUGE clearly was and remains a big step toward 
guaranteeing universal affordable health care to all Chileans, but it failed to 
correct the highly inequitable allocation of mandatory contributions to the 
health care system and thus do away with the two-class health care system. 
Moreover, it left a hole in coverage insofar as the poor enjoy free access to 
public health care, but informal sector workers above the poverty line - who 
mostly do not contribute to FONASA- are left out of the system. 
As in the rest of Latin America, noncontributory social transfers, or social 
assistance programs, have been poorly funded in Chile. In the fight against 
poverty, the Concertaci6n relied primarily on economic growth and adjust-
ments in the minimum wage for the short and medium run, and investment 
in human capital for the long run. Despite the impressive achievements in 
lowering poverty rates overall, there remained a sector of indigents outside the 
reach of the support mechanisms and human capital investments offered by the 
state. Chile Solidario was established in 2004 as a program that would bring 
some income support along with counseling from social workers to families 
" As of May 2009 the presidency and the finance ministry were finalizing details of the bill that 
will expand the illnesses covered by AUGE to eighty. 
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in extreme poverty. It gives access to a small cash benefit, paid to the female 
head of household, for participating in the program that consists of psycholog-
ical and social counseling, visits to a health center, and school attendance of 
children. It also offers access to the family-assistance subsidy, social-assistance 
pensions, and water subsidy, along with entrance into public preschool, drug 
and alcohol rehabilitation, and public employment programs (Serrano and 
Raczynski 2004). Preliminary evaluations indicate a high degree of support for 
the program among the participants (Perticara 2004) as well as an increased 
uptake of social assistance benefits, improved school attendance, and an expan-
sion in the use of primary health care services among Chile's most vulnerable 
citizens (Galasso 2006). This program was set up in an extremely targeted 
manner, and to magnify its impact, President Bachelet proposed its extension 
to the homeless. The cost of the program is difficult to calculate. It depends 
on whether the preexisting state subsidies like the family-assistance subsidy, 
social-assistance pensions, and water subsidy are included in the calculations. 
Even if they are, the total costs of noncontributory social transfers in Chile 
remain low, with spending totaling 0.7 percent of GDP in 2003 (Lindert et al. 
2006: 95). 
A third innovation that started on a very small scale but could potentially 
become import~nt if extended is unemployment insurance. It was introduced 
in 2002 and now covers about half of the Chilean labor force (Munoz Goma 
2007: 223). However, coverage will not grow under current labor market 
conditions because it is restricted to formal sector employment. Moreover, half 
of the ·labor force is an overestimate, because even in the formal sector job 
instability is high, so workers do not easily accumulate the necessary length of 
service to qualify for meaningful benefits. It is funded by contributions from 
employers, employees, and the state. As of now, the dominant protection in 
case of job loss in Chile remains lump sum compensation for the years of work 
in a job. That system has two major problems: First, it is inadequate for an 
economy with high levels of employment instability. Most workers do not have 
a chance to accumulate years of work with rights to compensation. Second, we 
know from comparative research that high levels of job protection or high costs 
of layoffs have a negative effect on employment (Bradley and Stephens 2007). 
Thus, it would be preferable to replace the present system with a universal 
unemployment insurance scheme. 
Labor law reform has been on the agenda of every Concertaci6n presi-
dent, but progress has remained highly limited. Pinochet's labor legislation 
was designed to keep unions weak by restricting bargaining to plant-level 
unions, encouraging multiple unions in an enterprise, and making it possible 
for employers to replace striking workers and fire workers without cause by 
claiming "business reasons" (Winn 2004). One of the key demands of unions 
since the transition has been legalization of bargaining above the plant level 
in order to strengthen worker solidarity and leverage. Another key demand 
has been the elimination of the right of employers to replace striking workers. 
Aylwin's labor law reforms of 1991-2 did not meet either one of these demands. 
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Frei proposed a reform package that included elimination of the right to replace 
striking workers, but militant opposition from business and the right led to a 
rejection of the reform by the Senate. Despite years of negotiations, major con-
cessions by the government, and passage of a reform package by the Chamber, 
the right remained intransigent and used its overrepresentation in the Senate to 
reject reforms a second and a third time (Frank 2004). President Lagos launched 
another attempt at labor law reform, and again the attempt ran into very stiff 
opposition from business and the right. Initially, the government announced 
that the prohibition on replacing striking workers was nonnegotiable, but under 
intense pressure from business, internal tensions in the Concertaci6n, and in 
a situation of lingering high unemployment, this change was dropped (Frank 
2004). As long as employers offer wage increases to keep up with inflation, they 
can replace striking workers and pay a small amount of money to each replaced 
worker. The 2001 reforms introduced additional protection for unionization 
and a reduction of the work week from forty-eight to forty-five hours as of 
200 5. The official figures indicate an increase in the unionization rate from 
16percent in 2001 to 19 percent of the employed labor force in 2005, but 
unions have remained weak as economic and political actors. '3 
The struggle over legalization of divorce deserves some comment as it exem-
plifies most clearly the constraints on the left stemming from its Christian 
Democratic coalition partners and from the overrepresentation of the right in 
the Senate, even on an issue for which there is overwhelming public support. 
As noted previously, in the three surveys of members of parliament carried 
out since 1990, Christian Democrats self-classified as markedly more religious 
than PS and PPD parliamentarians, and they were even more religious than 
members of the RN (Ruiz 2006: 93). The Catholic Church has consistently 
opposed legalization of divorce. Public opinion, in contrast, has long favored 
legalization, with various surveys showing two-thirds of the public being in 
favor of legal divorce even before 1990; and in 2002, 8 5 percent favored legal 
divorce on the basis of mutual consent (Blofield 2006: 97). Despite this over-
whelming public support, it took until 2004 to pass legislation. The law allows 
couples to file for divorce after a one-year separation, but the judge takes up to 
three years to process the filing, a process that includes mandatory mediation 
(Blofield 2006: ror-3). 
The most important achievement of President Bachelet as of early 2009 
was the pension reform. For some two decades, the Chilean pension reform, 
rammed through under the dictatorship, was the poster child of neoliberal 
social policy reform. Its architects, sometimes with the support of the World 
'3 These figures have to be discounted. They are based on official membership figures from unions, 
which tend to be inflated. Data from the World Values Survey of 2ooo paint a different picture. 
They show that only 4.8 percent of "employed workers" reported being a member of a union 
in Chile, the same level as neighboring Peru, clearly lower than Mexico with 9.8 percent, and 
Uruguay in 1995 with 16.7 percent and Brazil in 1995 with 25.2 percent (Martin and Brady 
2007: 569). 
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Bank, traveled the world with missionary zeal to convince governments con-
fronting pension systems under stress that privatization would be the solution 
to all their problems. The reality looks quite different. Despite the initially 
high returns on the investments in the pension funds, which were broadcast 
by the neoliberal reformers, the results in the longer run have failed to meet 
promises of reformers in virtually every respect. Effective coverage, that is, the 
proportion of the workforce making contributions to the pension system, did 
not increase. Administrative costs are very high, mainly because of marketing 
expenses. The system of commissions and fees weighs particularly heavily on 
lower-income earners and significantly lowers the real rate of return compared 
to the one claimed by the private Pension Fund Administrators (AFPs) (Mesa-
Lago and Arenas de Mesa 1998: 69). And there is no evidence that the new 
system caused an increase in the national savings rate (Uthoff 199 5 ). 
Given the instability in the labor market, the low wages, and the size of the 
informal sector, a large percentage of the workforce at their age of retirement 
will not have contributed for the required twenty years and thus be dependent 
on social assistance pensions. Another large percentage will not have accumu-
lated sufficient funds in their accounts to get beyond a subsidized minimum 
pension. In other words, the state will have to subsidize the pensions of low-
income earners without having the benefit of the contributions from middle-
and high-income earners. 
The new system will offer two kinds of solidaristic pensions for old-age, 
disability, and survivor benefits to individuals who have lived at least twenty 
years in Chile, including four of the five years immediately preceding their 
request for the pension. Old-age pensions can be requested by those sixty-five 
years and older. One kind is a basic universalistic pension for all those who 
have not contributed to a private pension fund and who are in the bottom 
6o percent of income earners. The other one is a solidaristic supplementary 
pension for all those whose accumulated pension funds yield a pension below 
a defined limit. All benefits will be phased in between 2008 and 2012. The 
basic universalistic pension in 2008 was set at 6o,ooo pesos per month, the 
equivalent of $12o, the total supported by a solidaristic supplementary pension 
at 70,ooo pesos. In 2009, the basic pension will increase to 75,000 pesos and 
the supplementary pension will be paid to people with pensions lower than 
12o,ooo pesos. Pensions supported by a supplementary pension will reach 
2 55 ,ooo in 20 r 2. There remains, therefore, a strong incentive for people to 
contribute to the pension system. 
The basic and supplementary solidaristic pensions will be financed by general 
revenue and by the Pension Reserve Fund set up under the Financial Respon-
sibility Law. The reform also contains some gender egalitarian elements, such 
as a bonus for time lost in the labor market by women due to the birth of a 
child. It further abolishes fixed commissions charged by AFPs, which weigh 
particularly heavy on low incomes, and it requires more transparency from the 
AFPs. It also contains some tax incentives for the middle classes whose pensions 
are above the limits that would entitle them to a supplementary pension. The 
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reform also allows AFPs to invest more abroad. The original bill approved by 
the Chamber included the establishment of a state-run AFP, but that provision 
was eliminated by the Senate. In sum, this is a major innovative reform because 
it establishes the right of every Chilean to a basic minimum income in old age 
and because it reintroduces the principle of solidarity into the individualistic 
Chilean pension system. It was one of Bachelet's priorities in her campaign, 
and she was able to get it passed. 
A second major theme in President Bachelet's campaign and her reform 
efforts was gender equity. In her program of government, she promised to 
increase women's labor force participation by creating a universal net of child 
care and preschool education, and to seek a national accord to get enterprises 
to offer more part-time work. 
Chilean policy toward working mothers is actually among the most generous 
in Latin America when it comes to maternity leave. Women have the right 
to eighteen weeks of paid leave from their job, six weeks before and twelve 
weeks after the birth of a child (U.S. Social Security Administration 1999). The 
leave is paid for by the state. They also enjoy protection from firing from the 
time when they inform their employer of their pregnancy until twelve months 
after the end of the maternity leave. Moreover, all employers who employ 
twenty or more women are required to offer day care for children of up to 
two years of age, either on the premises or by contracting with a child care 
provider elsewhere. Whereas women are well informed about their maternity 
leave rights and demand enforcement, the picture with day care is murkier 
(Stephens 2oo8). Some employers try to stay below the limit of twenty women, 
others pay some money directly to mothers instead of offering day care. And of 
course the huge proportion of women who work in the informal sector or in the 
formal sector without contracts have no access to any of these benefits. 14 And 
it is among low-income women where labor force participation is particularly 
low. Therefore, President Bachelet focu-sed on expanding provision of public 
day care places and as of May 2009 the administration had created 3,500 new 
public facilities (E/ Mercurio 2009). In January 2oo8, the minister in charge 
of SERNAM declared that women's labor force participation had increased 
significantly, from 38 percent to 40.3 percent, and she attributed this increase 
to a combination of increases in day care places, increasing levels of education 
among women, and the high economic growth environment (SERNAM 2oo8). 
The most obvious difference between President Bachelet and her predeces-
sors was her emphasis on gender issues, in particular her initial insistence on 
gender parity in all cabinet appointments. The women's movement (or move-
ments, that is, there was not one united movement but different groups) played 
a visible role in the push for democracy, and initial expectations for progress 
I4 Low-income women in Chile are much less likely to have access to contracted work than middle-
andupper-income women. In 2000, about 86.5 percent of females in the formal sector with 
earnings in the top-income quintile were contracted, while only 29.7 percent of women in the 
bottom income quintile had contracts (Pribble 2oo6c: 90). 
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toward gender equity under democracy were high. President Aylwin created 
SERNAM, a ministry in charge of women's issues. Under Christian Democratic 
leadership, SERNAM concentrated on protection for women in their roles as 
mothers and spouses or partners, staying clear of controversial issues related 
to sexuality or women's equality in the labor market. As noted previously, 
Bachelet's campaign emphasized the issue of public day care and preschool 
education to enable women to join the labor force. In a demonstrative gesture 
to underline the availability of highly qualified women and her administration's 
commitment to bringing them into leadership positions, she appointed women 
to half the cabinet and undersecretary positions. 
The evaluations of the success of this attempt are complex. In subsequent 
cabinet reshuffles, some prominent women leaders were replaced with male 
politicians with longer political experience. However, so were some of the ini-
tial male appointees. As insiders see it, Bachelet attempted a rejuvenation of 
the political elite and brought in not only women but also men with limited 
prior experience in top governmental positions. 1 5 She herself is not a member 
of the inner circle of the renovated Socialist leadership. There is a generational 
difference and a difference in social networks. Given the importance of per-
sonal connections in getting things done in Chile, this put her and her new 
appointees at a disadvantage, particularly when dealing with difficult political 
projects where concessions and compromises had to be obtained. Still, despite 
the difficulties encountered, there is no doubt that her presidency and her 
appointment strategy constitute a major symbolic advance for women. That 
symbolic advance is complemented by substantive advances in women-friendly 
policies such as in the pension reform and the expansion of public day care and 
preschool education. 
The Pinochet legacy in education has been a three-tiered system with extreme 
quality differences. The Concertaci6n governments have greatly increased 
expenditure on education but have not made much progress in reducing quality 
differentials. Schools are administered by municipalities and receive a per pupil 
subsidy from the national government. The subsidy from the national govern-
ment is not sufficient to provide a high-quality education. Poorer municipalities 
are not in a position to supplement education expenditures. As a result, the 
quality of public schools in poor municipalities is very low. The chances for 
students who attended all public schools to make it into university are close to 
zero. In the 2008 PSU, Chile's university entrance exam, about 57.6 percent 
of students from public (municipal) schools scored above 4 so points, while 
92.6 percent of students from private schools did (E/ Mercurio 2008). Publicly 
subsidized private schools may select students and they may levy additional 
fees, which of course excludes the poor. It was the Concertaci6n government 
under Christian Democrat Aylwin that introduced the additional payments in 
•s This information is based on interviews done by Huber in November 2007 with a former 
high-level official and with outside experts who work closely with the government. 
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these schools (Cox 2006: I3), a practice that clearly contributes to increased 
inequality. Socialist Bachelet attempted to reverse this practice but failed. 
Presidents Frei and Lagos did not enact major changes to the administration 
of education, but they did increase funding significantly. Additionally, the Frei 
administration passed an education reform that created a full school day. Lagos 
oversaw the implementation of this reform and extended mandatory education 
to twelve years. President Bachelet initiated a major discussion on educational 
reform, in part in response to large and partly violent student protests in 2006. 
The attempt to draft a reform law brought severe tensions to the surface, and 
the result was an interparty/intercoalition agreement that omitted the key issues 
of municipal control of schools and of extra payments in publicly subsidized 
private schools. 16 This agreement formed the basis for the new education law, 
which was passed in April 2009. In a separate piece of legislation, the public 
subsidy for vulnerable students was increased. 
Another major campaign theme of Bachelet's was citizen participation, or 
open and participatory government. Rhetorically, the commitment to political 
inclusion has been a theme for all Concertaci6n governments, and under Lagos, 
a law on citizen participation was passed. However, as noted previously, all 
these governments have kept organized groups at arm's length. Rather than 
attempting to strengthen civil society and build organizational ties to various 
groups, the Concertaci6n parties have kept their distance and have discour-
aged mobilization. The following quote from interviews conducted by Pribble 
illustrates this well: 
"In the 198os Chile was full of strong and organized social groups ... Beginning in 1990, 
however, all of that changed because the Concertaci6n worked to de-mobilize and dis-
articulate these groups. This process of demobilization was achieved by bringing people 
into the bureaucratic apparatus, but also by ensuring the political parties cut off all rela-
tions with social groups and didn't help such organizations extend their power ... The 
political parties in this country aren't concerned with strengthening organization and 
mobilization" (Pribble 2oo6b). 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, the Socialist-led coalition governments under Presidents Lagos and 
Bachelet have notable achievements to point to. Certainly the completion of 
the democratic transition, with the abolition of the designated senators and 
the reestablishment of civilian control over military appointments, was fun-
damental symbolically and in practice for making progress in other crucial 
retorms. Plan AUGE and the pension reform constituted major departures from 
the neoliberal model of narrowly targeted and market-driven social policy. 
16 The agreement makes only a vague commitment to eliminating admissions standards. It states: 
"norms will be established to ensure that admissions processes in each educational establishment 
are transparent, objective, and do not discriminate arbitrarily" (Government of Chile 2007, 
translation by authors). 
Evelyne Huber, Jennifer Pribble, and John D. Stephens 
The key here is that the left presidents implemented programs that benefit 
large majorities of the population and thus leave a policy legacy with a strong 
political support base that will make it difficult for successor governments to 
curtail the programs. We know from the comparative literature on welfare state 
retrenchment that the programs with the largest reach are the most difficult 
to cut. Moreover, the Pension Reserve Fund constitutes a major step toward 
putting the financing of the solidaristic pensions on a firm basis. 
Prominent among partial achievements in crucial areas, where improvement 
is still needed, is campaign financing. Reducing the influence of large donors on 
campaigns is critical for curtailing the advantage of the right and the powerful 
influence of business on the political process. Critical areas from the point 
of view of a successful left project where business and the right have been 
intransigent and able to block progress are labor law reform and tax reform. 
Reform of the electoral system could be a further step toward reducing the 
advantage of the right, depending on the type of reform introduced. Electoral 
reform is being put on the agenda, but it will be exceedingly difficult to reach 
consensus within the Concertaci6n, not to speak of an intercoalition agreement. 
The clearest general failure of the left governments, at least up to 2007, 
has been a reduction of inequality in income and wealth. The figures for 2007 
show a very slight decrease in income inequality, but it remains to be seen 
whether this is a solid trend. The governments tried in several ways to reduce 
inequality, such as through the AUGE solidarity fund, efforts to reduce the 
quality differences in education by making it impossible for publicly subsidized 
private schools to select students and charge additional fees, and the tax reform. 
However, they could not generate sufficient support to overcome opposition to 
these redistributive reforms. Another case of failure is labor law reform, which 
would have indirectly contributed to lowering inequality by giving workers 
more leverage to demand wage increases. Together with labor law reform, 
arguably the most critical area of failure is tax reform, because a significant 
increase in tax collection would allow for an equally significant increase in 
social expenditures that could be directed at the lower three quintiles of the 
income distribution. 
We would argue that these critical failures are related to omissions, that 
is, areas where the governments did not develop any initiatives, specifically 
in strengthening unions and other social movements and in establishing links 
between parties and civil society. Leaving these movements weak and discon-
nected from left parties means that the governments failed to shift the balance 
of power in society by establishing a counterweight to the powerful business 
sector. The top political leadership circles also have not strengthened their par-
ties as organizations with an internally participatory and democratic life, and 
a strong ongoing recruitment effort. On the one hand, these omissions have 
protected the maneuvering room of the top leadership, but on the other hand 
they have deprived the leadership of a larger organized base and of institution-
alized channels for internal conflict resolution that would produce decisions 
accepted as legitimate by the members. They have also deprived the leadership 
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of relationships to social movements and unions characterized by mutual trust. 
Accordingly, if these social actors want to exert pressures for change, they need 
to resort to mass mobilization and confrontational tactics, and confrontation 
carries the potential of escaping the control of the leaders. As a result, both the 
government and the social actors may get locked into postures that obstruct 
progress on reforms and hurt both sides in terms of support among the pop-
ulation at large. Comparative evidence shows that the most successful social 
democratic projects were carried by alliances between left parties and social 
movements. 
